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Abstract 
It is difficult to apply experience in dynamic coupled systems functional hazard assessment (FHA), for the failure 
chain of Dynamic coupled systems (DCS) is often long and complex. The aim of this paper is to establish a more 
detailed process, Simulation-Aided FHA (SAFHA), for DCS safety analysis. This approach makes it possible to 
conduct FHA with less experience and also makes it possible to reuse more experience learned in earlier SAFHA 
conducted for similar systems. 
© 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of ENAC
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, system safety assessment has become an integral part of system design. [1, 2]This is 
especially true for systems which may cause death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of 
equipment or property, or damage to the environment. Generally, system designers use Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA), System Safety Assessment (SSA) 
and Common Cause Analysis (CCA) etc. to assess the safety level of their systems [3-7]. As systems 
being built are increasingly complex and large, we started to face new challenges in system safety 
assessment technology. 
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The example of wheel brake system FHA in SAE ARP-4761 [2] is quite detailed, but the method used 
in that example is still difficult to apply in turbofan engines. Compared with turbofan engine, functions of 
aircraft are relatively independent [8]. For instance, the wheel brake system, thrust reverser system and 
ground spoiler system runs independently. If one or more of them malfunction, the rest of these systems 
won’t be influenced. But in turbofan engine systems, one functional failure could be conducted to several 
other functions. This phenomenon will be described in the later part of this paper. The cause of the 
difference between aircraft and engine are considered to be the coupling and dynamic effects, which 
means gas turbine engine is a typical Dynamic Coupled System (DCS). 
Nomenclature 
ܦ Danger index of safety-critical parameter, Air moisture 
H Sea level elevation
݉ Changing magnitude of a safety critical parameter 
Ma Flight Mach number 
N Engine rotor speed 
ܲ Working parameter, Atmospheric pressure 
ݐ Changing tendency of a safety critical parameter, Time 
T Atmospheric temperature
ܹ Weight 
ݔ Independent variable which represents a functional condition 
ࣟ Element of the OR-EECC-FC cube  
ࣱ Working condition of dynamic coupled system 
߬ Time 
Subscripts 
i An operating regime
j An environmental and emergency configuration condition 
k A failure condition 
l A working parameter 
ߙ A safety-critical parameter
The characters of DCS are as follows: 
x Governing equations of DCS are non-linear algebraic equations and differential equations 
x The elements of DCS are dependent with each other, some disturbance occurs in one element could be 
reflected in the whole system immediately. 
x The behavior of DCS largely depends on initial and boundary conditions. 
Recently, along with the performance requirements increase, the coupling and dynamical effects of 
DCS are increasing as well. To use FHA in DCS, the problem that we have to face is how to analyze the 
chain of functional failure conduction and all their effects. P J Wilkinson and T P Kelly studied the 
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application of FHA in Engine controller; a Consequence Loop functional model has been established to 
solve this problem [3]. But the Consequence Loop is limited to model components which have obvious 
connections. For some DCS, the chain of functional failure conduction is far from obvious [8]. It seems 
impossible that analyzing the dynamic process in DCS by comparative and superlative words only. A new 
FHA approach is required to deal with this kind of problem. 
‘What if’ is often asked during FHA. A hypothetical DCS functional failure often influents its 
governing equations and it makes FHA more difficult, for the behavior of DCS with functional failure is 
different from normal DCS. Therefore, a functional failure-injection simulation based on DCS model is 
considered to be used to analyze the effect of functional failure of DCS. In this paper, FHA which uses 
functional failure-injection simulation based on DCS model to analyze the DCS effects is defined as 
Simulation-Aided FHA (SAFHA). 
SAFHA not only has the capability to assist DCS FHA, but also can ‘remember’ previous experiences. 
During normal FHA, experience is applied to analyze effects in a specific scene with functional failure. It 
converts scene to effect in a single step [2, 9]. A small change of scene requires a reanalyze which is time 
consuming. Nevertheless, in SAFHA, experiences are divide-and-use. That means different experiences 
are applied to several steps respectively, such as identification of safety-critical parameter, the 
parameterization of importance and identification of DCS effects. Divide-and-use makes it possible to 
reuse more experiences in future similar DCS SAFHA. 
In addition, SAFHA might be the only applicable method to assess the functional hazard of a new 
designing CDS, for there are no experiences (or few experiences) during the concept design stage. 
This paper established a SAFHA process based on SAE ARP-4761. With this new approach, SAFHA 
for a DCS, Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) system, was carried out. 
2. Overview of SAFHA approach 
SAFHA is regarded as a refinement rather than a replacement for classical FHA. Fig. 1 shows the 
relation of classical FHA and SAFHA. Most steps (step a~b and d~g) are the same, but SAFHA 
decomposes the step c of classical FHA to three sub steps. 
Fig. 1. Traditional FHA and SAFHA process 
It can be seen from Fig. 1, if step c(1) to c(3) of SAFHA are regarded as a whole, the input and output 
of these steps are equivalent to step c of traditional FHA. The main input, output and components of 
SAFHA are showed in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. The main input, output and components of SAFHA 
2.1. Selection of models in SAFHA 
As illustrated in Fig. 2, when performing SAFHA, the selection of models is a key problem which must 
be faced with. It is not possible that solving all problems encountered in SAFHA by simulation models 
only. Experiences are essential to SAFHA as well as classical FHA. The simulation models are introduced 
to dealing with the high coupling effects which makes it difficult to analysis by experiences. As a result, 
the coupling level of neighbor links in failure chain must be assessed when select models used in SAFHA. 
The failure propagation between neighbor links with high coupling effect, in general, should be analysis 
by simulation models carefully. 
Fig. 3. Nested relations between systems on different level 
To illustrate the principle, a model selection example of FADEC system SAFHA is provided below. 
Fig. 3 is a graphic expression of the nested relations of aircraft, propulsion system, engine system and 
FADEC system. Effects of FADEC functional failure conditions on the aircraft, crew and occupants is to 
be determined by SAFHA. A typical failure chain from functional failure of FADEC to aircraft collision 
is showed in Fig. 4. Compare with the others, the coupling effect between engine and FADEC, a pair of 
neighbor links in failure chain, is strong. So a model which is able to capture the coupling effect is 
considered to introduce into SAFHA of FADEC system. 
Fig. 4. Typical failure chain from functional failure of FADEC to aircraft collision 
2.2. Simulation plan of SAFHA 
Different from the classical FHA, SAFHA introduces the failure-injection simulation which requires all 
of the input information must be parameterized. Conversion of failure-injection simulation result, 
 SAFHA
ExperiencesModels
Main Input
Environmental and Emergency 
Configuration
Failure Condition Determination
Main Output
Effect of Failure Conditions on the 
Aircraft, Crew and Occupants


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normally in form of working parameters versus time, to DCS effects is needed as well. The specific steps, 
step c(1) to c(3) in Fig. 1, of SAFHA are briefly explained as follow: 
2.2.1. Parameterization of input data 
The detail of parameterization is described below: 
x Parameterization of functional failure conditions and normal/degraded environments: All of these 
inputs are frequently described in natural language, which restricts the use of failure-injection 
simulation. In order to use failure-injection simulation, therefore, it is necessary to parameterization of 
these inputs.  
x Identification of representative operating regime of DCS in the form of Initial Conditions (IC) and 
Boundary Conditions (BC): During different working processes, the working conditions of DCS are 
different. As a result, the safety margins of DCS are different too. Therefore, all of representative 
process should be identified and described in form of IC and BC for DCS simulations. 
If an advisable data structure can be selected to organizing input data, it is conducive to the realization 
of the entire algorithm[10]. Apparently, the input data of failure-injection simulation has a cubical 
structure. Input data of failure-injection simulation is a three-dimensional array. It can be organized into 
an Operating Regime/Environmental and Emergency Configuration Condition/Failure Condition Cube 
(OR-EECC-FC Cube), which showed in Fig. 5 graphically. As a matter of convenience, we can introduce 
a symbol ࣟ௜௝௞ to represent each element of the cube, the subscripts, i, j and k represent different ORˈ
EECC and FC respectively. Where ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ݉.݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݊.݇ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݌.
2.2.2. Functional failure-injection simulation 
Failure-injection simulation conducts the conversion of each OR-EECC-FC element (ࣟ௜௝௞) to Working 
Conditions ( ௜ࣱ௝௞) of DCS. Each element of output data, ௜ࣱ௝௞ , is constituted of a series of working 
parameters depending on time which can be written as ௜ࣱ௝௞ ൌ ൣ ଵܲሺ߬ሻǡ ଶܲሺ߬ሻǡڮ ǡ ௤ܲሺ߬ሻ൧௜௝௞ ൌ ௟ܲǡ௜௝௞ሺ߬ሻ, l
represents different working parameters. Where ݈ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݍ.
2.2.3. Determination of the effects of the functional failure condition 
As mentioned above, DCS simulation results are usually various working parameters as functions of 
time. Intuitively, because these parameters describe the DCS working conditions versus time, safety 
margins can be determined according to their value. In fact, that is not enough. FHA is the first step in 
safety assessment process, which is iterative in nature. In addition, as better understanding of the system 
diminishes total iterative steps, every piece of information that can be gotten should be deliberated. Hence, 
besides the value of result, the sensitivity of DCS safety-critical parameters to failure condition would 
provide useful information as well. The detail steps are described below: 
x Identification of safety-critical parameters group and extraction of these parameters from working 
condition cube: Each of ௜ࣱ௝௞ is constitute of several working parameters depend on time, ௟ܲǡ௜௝௞ሺ߬ሻ,
some parameters are often safety-critical, such as maximum, sometimes minimum, temperature in 
DCS, safety margin of DCS component and other DCS performance parameters related to safety. 
These safety-critical parameters are ௟ܲഀǡ௜௝௞ሺ߬ሻǡ ߙ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ ݎǡ ݈ఈ ൒ ߙ. Safety-critical parameters groups 
can be reused in future similar DCS SAFHA. 
x Calculation of the changing magnitude and the changing tendency of each safety-critical parameter 
between normal and failure conditions. 
݉௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ൌ ൞
୫୧୬ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕǡ೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሺఛሻ൧ି୫୧୬ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕೖሺఛሻ൧
ห୫୧୬ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕǡ೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሺఛሻ൧ห
୫ୟ୶ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕೖሺఛሻ൧ି୫ୟ୶ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕǡ೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሺఛሻ൧
ห୫ୟ୶ൣ௉೗ഀǡ೔ೕǡ೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሺఛሻ൧ห
݂݅ܾ݅݃݃݁ݎ ௟ܲഀ݅݉݌݈݅݁ݏݏ݂ܽ݁ݎ
݂݅ݏ݈݈݉ܽ݁ݎ ௟ܲഀ݅݉݌݈݅݁ݏݏ݂ܽ݁ݎ
(1)
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ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ൌ
௠೗ഀǡ೔ೕೖ
ȁ௙ሺ௫೙೚ೝ೘ೌ೗ሻି௙ሺ௫ೖሻȁ
       (2) 
Where ݉ is the changing magnitude of a safety critical parameter; ݐ is the changing tendency of a 
safety critical parameter; ݔ is the independent variable which represents a functional condition; is 
the subscript to represent a normal condition which opposite to failure conditions; ݂ሺݔ௞ሻ is the evaluation 
function of a functional condition k. The functional form will be iteratively determined by analyst. It can 
be reused in similar DCS SAFHA. ȁ݂ሺݔ௡௢௥௠௔௟ሻ െ ݂ሺݔ௞ሻȁ indicates the distance from normal condition to 
functional failure condition k.
Fig. 5. The OR-EECC-FC cube for SAFHA 
x Construction of danger index: Danger index can be calculated by 
ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ൌ ௠ܹǡ௟ഀ ή ݉௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ൅ ௧ܹǡ௟ഀ ή ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞      (3) 
Where ௠ܹǡ௟ഀ is the weight of ݉௟ഀ, which should be positive; ௧ܹǡ௟ഀ is the weight of ݐ௟ഀ, which should be 
positive, too; ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ is the danger index of safety-critical parameter ௟ܲഀǡ௜௝௞ሺ߬ሻ, when the DCS occurring 
FC k in EECC j during OR i. Positive danger index means danger, negative danger index means safe. 
Weight represents the importance of its according factor. The weights in equation (3) should be 
manipulated to make the danger index value generally reflects the severity of its corresponding functional 
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failure effect. Weights can be reused in future similar DCS SAFHA. For any positive weights, the sign of 
danger index will not change, e.g. weights influence the value of danger index, but they will not confuse 
the safe and dangerous state only if they are positive. 
x Preliminary analysis for the effect of each positive ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ which represents the danger index of each 
ࣟ௜௝௞.
3. Problems experienced when attempting SAFHA 
The steps of SAFHA appear simple, however, when attempting to carry out SAFHA to a DCS, several 
problems were encountered. These problems are: 
3.1. Parameterizing functional failure conditions: 
In some cases, the parameterization is so difficult that it is almost impossible to accomplish, such as 
Human-In-Loop cases. Loss of communication and loss of navigation is a multiple failure condition 
during aircraft FHA, which regarded as a typical example of those cases. For these cases, effects analysis 
often can be done by experiences and it is not necessary to employ failure-injection simulation. 
3.2. The applicability of DCS model 
DCS models are usually established based on the normal DCS configuration. If the system 
configuration has not been influenced by a failure, most DCS models are suitable for the failure-injection 
simulation. If a failure which will influence the system configuration occurring, the analysis ability of 
DCS models should be double-checked. A representative example is that a functional failure of turbofan 
engine causes the engine casing breakage, the secondary effects cannot be considered by the normal 
model of turbofan engine. Under these kinds of circumstances, other analysis technics should be 
introduced. 
3.3. The form of evaluation functions 
Evaluation function can be informally regarded as the measurement of a functional failure condition. 
The form of evaluation functions depends on the attribute of the functional condition parameter. 
If a functional condition can be parameterized as a continuous variable which independent from time, 
the evaluation function can be the functional condition parameter itself or its function; If a functional 
condition can be parameterized as a discrete variable which independent from time, the evaluation 
function can be functional condition parameter itself or a mapping of functional condition onto a set 
which has different values; If a functional condition can be parameterized as a variable which dependent 
on time, the evaluation function can be maximum function, minimum function or weighted time integral 
of a proper function of the functional condition parameter. 
The choice of the specific expression of evaluation function is iterative in nature. Different evaluation 
function may result in different absolute value of ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞, but the sign of ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ depends on ݉௟ഀǡ௜௝௞, ie. the 
evaluation function does not make an dangerous situation seems like a safe one and vice versa. But a 
proper evaluation function should be generally proportional to the deviation of a functional failure 
condition from normal condition. That will make it easier to manipulate the weights in equation (3). 
3.4. Effects of control system functional failure 
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In order to conduct FHA for a control system, it is essential to find out the functional failure effect on 
its controlled plant because the effect cannot be determined inside the control system. 
4. Application of SAFHA for TBV control function of FADEC system 
Full authority digital engine control (FADEC) is a system consisting of electronic engine controller 
(EEC) and its related accessories that control all aspects of turbofan engine performance [11]. Gas turbine 
engine system is a typical DCS which governed by the engine non-linear algebraic equations and 
differential equations. Any FADEC output exception will impact the engine working condition caused by 
the engine re-matching. Some failure chains of gas turbine engine system is quite tedious and complicate 
[8]. What if a failure occurs in the TBV control function of FADEC system? The strong coupling effect 
makes this question is hard to answer by experience only. This part introduces an example of SAFHA 
which conducts on the FADEC system. 
The transient bleed valve (TBV) is used to prevent stalling of the HPC at low rotor speeds. TBV is 
connected to the final stage of high pressure compressor (HPC) [12]. TBV is controlled by EEC, the 
control logics are listed below: 
x During engine start until the engine has reached idle and the starting sequence is finished: Open 
x During acceleration above idle and N2 speed is less than 80%: Open 
x Other process: Closed. 
Because the TBV control function is a function of FADEC, a control system, the effect of its failure 
conditions on controlled plant of FADEC (i.e. the engine) should be determined. 
4.1. Parameterization of input Data 
4.1.1. Parameterization of TBV control functional failures 
Fig. 6 identifies the functional failure conditions of TBV control function. Then, these failure 
conditions are parameterized and expressed in form of failure control plans which are showed in 
equation(5)-equation(9). For the purpose of comparison, equation (4), the normal TBV control plan, is 
demonstrated as well. 
Fig. 6. Functional failure conditions of TBV control function 
்ܲ஻௏ǡ௡௢௥௠௔௟ ൌ ቐ
ͳͲͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ ͲǡͲ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘
ͳͲͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ Ͳǡ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ͺͲΨ ଶܰǡ௠௔௫
ͲΨ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ
    (4) 
்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௢௣௘௡ ൌ ቐ
ͳͲͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ ͲǡͲ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘
ͳͲͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ Ͳǡ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ͺͲΨ ଶܰǡ௠௔௫
ͳͲͲΨ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ
   (5) 
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i.e. ்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௢௣௘௡ ؠ ͳͲͲΨ       (6) 
்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௖௟௢௦௘ௗ ൌ ቐ
ͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ ͲǡͲ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘
ͲΨ ሶܰଶ ൐ Ͳǡ ଶܰǡ௜ௗ௟௘ ൏ ଶܰ ൏ ͺͲΨ ଶܰǡ௠௔௫
ͲΨ ݋ݐ݄݁ݎ
    (7) 
i.e. ்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௖௟௢௦௘ௗ ؠ ͲΨ        (8) 
்ܲ஻௏ǡௌ௛௔௞௘ ൌ ͷͲΨ ൅ ͷͲΨ ή ሺെͳሻہଶఔ௧ۂ       (9) 
Where ்ܲ஻௏ǡ௡௢௥௠௔௟ is normal TBV control plan; ்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௢௣௘௡ is a TBV control plan to parameterize 
the failure condition of always open; ்ܲ஻௏ǡ௔௟௪௔௬௦௖௟௢௦௘ௗ is a TBV control plan to parameterize the failure 
condition of always closed; ்ܲ஻௏ǡௌ௛௔௞௘  is a TBV control plan to parameterize the failure condition of 
shake; ɋ is the shake frequency of bleed valve. 
4.1.2. Parameterization of environmental and emergency configuration List 
Examples of Emergency conditions include the following: 
x Loss of aircraft power supply; 
x Loss of air cooling, etc. 
Since these emergency conditions are common problems which influence all of FADEC functions, it is 
not necessary to be considered at the TBV level. 
Environmental conditions to be considered include the following. 
x Sea level elevation. 
x Atmospheric temperature. 
x Atmospheric pressure 
x Flight Mach number. 
x Atmospheric moisture, etc. 
As engine operating regime is sensitive to environmental conditions, environmental conditions are 
necessary to be considered at TBV level. In this paper, for the sake of conciseness, two typical 
environmental conditions are selected and parameterized. 
x Sea level/ISA/Static/Dry air i.e. H=0m, T=288.15K, P=0.100MPa, Ma=0, D=0
x Plateau/High temperature/0.2 Ma/Dry air i.e. H=3500m, T=310.40K, P=0.066MPa, Ma=0.2, D=0
Where H is the sea level elevation; T is the atmospheric temperature; P is the atmospheric pressure; Ma
is the flight Mach number; D is the atmospheric moisture. 
4.1.3. Parameterization of typical operating regimes 
Start process, idle steady state, transient process from idle to max takeoff and transient process form 
max takeoff to idle, etc. are typical operating regimes. In this paper, for the sake of conciseness, two 
operating regimes which considered representative are selected and parameterized. 
x Max takeoff to idle 
ଵܰǡ୥୧୴ୣ୬ ൌ ൜
ଵܰ௥ǡ୫ୟ୶ ݐ ൑ ݐ଴
ଵܰ௥ǡ୧ୢ୪ୣ ݐ ൐ ݐ଴
        (10) 
x Idle to max takeoff 
ଵܰ௥ǡ୥୧୴ୣ୬ ൌ ൜
ଵܰ௥ǡ୧ୢ୪ୣ ݐ ൑ ݐ଴
ଵܰ௥ǡ୫ୟ୶ ݐ ൐ ݐ଴
       (11) 
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4.2. Functional failure-injection simulation 
In this part, the turbofan engine system dynamic model was introduced. Then the OR-EECC-FC cube 
was converted into working condition cube by failure-injection simulation based on that model. 
4.2.1. Turbofan engine system dynamic model 
The turbofan engine system dynamic model consists of the gas path model and the FADEC system 
model [8], as can be seen in Fig. 7. 
The gas path model consists of static elements: Inlet, Fan, Booster, TBV, High pressure compressor 
(HPC), Combustor, High pressure turbine (HPT), Low pressure turbine (LPT), Bypass, main and bypass 
Nozzle, which are modeled as lumped parameter thermodynamic systems, represented by performance 
maps, constant coefficients, and thermo and aero-dynamic relationships and the dynamic elements which 
include the following: Low speed rotor and High speed rotor. In this model, the rotor dynamics (for the 
high speed and low speed rotors) is represented by the equation of conservation of angular momentum 
[13]. 
Fig. 7. Turbofan engine system dynamic model 
The FADEC system model showed in Fig. 7 is a simplified one, which only consists of the fuel control 
loop model and the TBV control loop model [14]. 
Simulation which runs on the turbofan engine system dynamic model will carry out the following steps 
again and again until it is finished: (1)The FADEC system model acquires working parameters from the 
gas path model via virtual sensors at time . These working parameters will be used by the fuel control 
loop model and the TBV control loop model as inputs to work out a new fuel flow rate value and a new 
TBV position value at the same time. (2) The new values will be inputted into gas path model at ݐ ൅ ߂ݐ,
which may change the working parameters of gas path immediately. (3) ݐ ൌ ݐ ൅ ߂ݐ.
4.2.2. Failure-injection simulation process 
Input data were organized in an OR-EECC-FC Cube. Then, the failure-injection simulation was carried 
out, which converts the OR-EECC-FC cube into the working conditions cube. This process is showed in 
Fig. 8. The structure of input data and output data are showed in Fig. 8 as well. 
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Fig. 8. Schematic diagram of failure-injection simulation 
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4.3. Determination of effects based on working condition cube 
Safety requirements from airworthiness regulations are inputs of FHA. Safety requirements for 
FADEC system from FAR 33[15] can be collected into Table 1. TBV position control function failure 
hazard level classification should be based on Table 1. 
4.3.1. Identification of safety-critical parameters group 
Safety-critical parameters of turbofan engine are showed in Table 2. This group can be reused in future 
similar DCS SAFHA with a simple rechecking. 
4.3.2. Changing magnitude and changing tendency of each safety-critical parameters 
The evaluation functions and weights can be taken as follow: 
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ ൝
െͳ ܶܤܸ݈ܽݓܽݕݏ݋݌݁݊݅݁Ǥ ݔ ൌ ݔଶ
Ͳ ݊݋ݎ݈݉ܽ݅݁Ǥ ݔ ൌ ݔ௡௢௥௠௔௟
ͳ ܶܤܸ݈ܽݓܽݕݏ݈ܿ݋ݏ݁݀݅݁Ǥ ݔ ൌ ݔଵ
     (12) 
௠ܹǡ௟ഀ ൌ ͳ ߙ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ͹        (13)
௧ܹǡ௟ഀ ൌ ͳ ߙ ൌ ͳǡʹǡڮ ǡ͹        (14) 
Table 3 shows the changing magnitude , the changing tendency and the danger index of each safety-
critical parameters. These values were worked out by equation(1)-equation(3) and equation(12)-
equation(14) based on the working condition cube showed in Fig. 8. 
Table. 1 Safety requirements for FADEC system from FAR 33 [15-17] 
Hazard
level
Engine effects 
Probability
range 
Hazardous
(1) Non-containment of high-energy debris; 
(2) Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air intended for the cabin sufficient to 
incapacitate crew or passengers; 
(3) Significant thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot; 
(4) Uncontrolled fire; 
(5) Failure of the engine mount system leading to inadvertent engine separation; 
(6) Complete inability to shut the engine down. 
10-7~10-9 per 
engine flight 
hour 
Major 
(1) Controlled fires (that is, those fires brought under control by shutting down the engine or by 
on-board extinguishing systems); 
(2) Case burnthrough when it can be shown that there is no propagation to hazardous engine 
effects; 
(3) Release of low-energy debris when applicants can show that the release does not progress to 
a hazardous engine effect; 
(4) Vibration levels that result in crew discomfort; 
(5) Concentration of toxic products in the engine bleed air for the cabin sufficient to degrade 
crew performance; 
(6) Thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot, below the level defined as a 
hazardous engine effect; 
(7) Generation of thrust greater than maximum rated thrust; 
(8) Loss of engine support loadpath integrity without actual engine separation; 
(9) Significant uncontrollable thrust oscillation; 
(10) Loss of thrust control (LOTC); 
(11) An effect whose severity falls between minor and hazardous engine effects. 
10-5~10-7 per 
engine flight 
hour 
Minor An engine failure in which the only consequence is partial or complete loss of thrust or power 
(and associated engine services) from the engine will be regarded as a minor engine effect. 
—
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Table. 2 Identified safety-critical parameters group 
ߙ Safety-critical parameter ( ௟ܲഀ) Symbol Attribute 
1 ௟ܲభ: Low speed rotor speed N1 Smaller value implies safer 
2 ௟ܲమ: High speed rotor speed N2 Smaller value implies safer 
3 ௟ܲయ: Fan surge margin Fan SM Bigger value implies safer 
4 ௟ܲర: Booster surge margin Booster SM Bigger value implies safer 
5 ௟ܲఱ: High pressure compressor surge margin HPC SM Bigger value implies safer 
6 ௟ܲల: High pressure turbine inlet temperature T4* Smaller value implies safer 
7 ௟ܲళ: High pressure compressor outlet static pressure PS3 Smaller value implies safer 
4.3.1. Preliminary analysis for all positive ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞
As discussed before, danger indexes which less than or equal to zero implies a safe condition. Thus, it 
is not necessary to analyze such situations. Analyzing all FC-EECC-OR cube element which has a 
positive ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞, we can determine the effect for each i, j and k. Table 4 is the result of preliminary analysis. 
Because the weights and evaluation functions selected in equation(12)-equation(14) are not selected 
iteratively, the sequence of severity (i.e. Classification in Table 4) and the sequence of danger indexes are 
not perfectly matching. It is feasible for small-scale problems, such as this example. But in case of large-
scale problem, selecting the weights and evaluation functions iteratively would be helpful for data reusing 
in future similar DCS SAFHA. 
Table. 3 Changing magnitude and the changing tendency of each safety-critical parameters 
ߙ i j k ݉௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ k ݉௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ݐ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
2 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
3 1 1 1 0.055 0.055 0.11 2 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 0.207 0.207 0.414 2 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.018 2 0 0 0 
6 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
7 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1 2 1 1 0.021 0.021 0.042 2 0 0 0 
2 2 1 1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 2 -0.014 -0.014 -0.028 
3 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.026 
4 2 1 1 0.185 0.185 0.37 2 -0.067 -0.067 -0.134 
5 2 1 1 -0.059 -0.059 -0.118 2 0.037 0.037 0.074 
6 2 1 1 0.027 0.027 0.054 2 -0.016 -0.016 -0.032 
7 2 1 1 0.013 0.013 0.026 2 0 0 0 
1 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
3 1 2 1 0.02 0.02 0.04 2 0 0 0 
4 1 2 1 0.227 0.227 0.454 2 0 0 0 
5 1 2 1 0.001 0.001 0.002 2 0 0 0 
6 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
7 1 2 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
1 2 2 1 0.024 0.024 0.048 2 0 0 0 
2 2 2 1 -0.019 -0.019 -0.038 2 -0.015 -0.015 -0.03 
3 2 2 1 0 0 0 2 -0.012 -0.012 -0.024 
4 2 2 1 0.15 0.15 0.3 2 -0.048 -0.048 -0.096 
5 2 2 1 -0.188 -0.188 -0.376 2 -0.036 -0.036 -0.072 
6 2 2 1 0.016 0.016 0.032 2 -0.025 -0.025 -0.05 
7 2 2 1 0.005 0.005 0.01 2 -0.014 -0.014 -0.028 
4.1. FHA table 
According to the safety requirements shown in Table 1, considering the preliminary analysis showed in 
Table 4, the FHA table, Table 5, can be concluded with less experience. 
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Table. 4 Preliminary analysis for all positive ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞
ܦ௟ഀǡ௜௝௞ ߙ i j k Effect Classification 
0.454 4 1 2 1 Engine vibration Major 
0.414 4 1 1 1 Engine vibration Major 
0.11 3 1 1 1 Engine vibration Major 
0.04 3 1 2 1 No Safety Effect No Safety Effect 
0.002 5 1 2 1 No Safety Effect No Safety Effect 
0.37 4 2 1 1 Engine vibration Major 
0.3 4 2 2 1 Engine vibration Major 
0.054 6 2 1 1 T4* exceeds T4*max 50K To Be Determined
0.048 1 2 2 1 N1 exceeds N1max 2.4% No Safety Effect 
0.042 1 2 1 1 N1 exceeds N1max 2.1% No Safety Effect 
0.032 6 2 2 1 T4* exceeds T4*max 30K To Be Determined
0.026 7 2 1 1 PS3 exceeds PS3max 1.3% No Safety Effect 
0.01 7 2 2 1 PS3 exceeds PS3max 0.5% No Safety Effect 
0.074 5 2 1 2 Engine vibration Major 
Table. 5 FHA table: TBV control function 
Function 
Failure 
condition 
Phase Effect Classification 
TBV
control 
Always open 
From max 
takeoff to idle 
Booster and fan surge margin decrease significantly, stall and surge 
could happen to booster and fan, these kind of phenomena could result 
in engine vibration, which is enough to makes the crew uncomfortable. 
Major 
TBV
control 
Always open 
From idle to 
max takeoff 
The maximum turbine inlet temperature increases about 50K during the 
engine acceleration at operation regime 1. Consequences are TBD 
pending the turbine blade design and the secondary air system design. 
To Be 
Determined 
TBV
control 
Always
closed 
From max 
takeoff to idle 
All of identified safety-critical parameters are not exceeding zero. No 
safety effect. 
No Safety 
Effect 
TBV
control 
Always
closed 
From idle to 
max takeoff 
HPC surge margin decreases significantly, stall and surge could happen 
to HPC, these kind of phenomena could result in engine vibration, 
which is enough to makes the crew uncomfortable. 
Major 
5. Conclusions 
The classical FHA as it is currently used in many systems is facing challenges in DCS. It is not 
possible to work out the effect of a DCS functional failure without plenty of experience. The SAFHA is a 
refined version of classical FHA, which is extended with the failure-injection simulation. It was developed 
in order to increase the applicability of FHA approach and to enable reusing more experience. 
As an example, a SAFHA has been carried out for TBV control functional failure of a turbofan 
FADEC system. The results confirm that the SAFHA is a useful approach to assess the hazard level of 
DCS functional failures. The results also confirm that SAFHA has the capability to find out obscure DCS 
effects with less experience and also has the capability to accumulate experience learned during DCS 
SAFHA. 
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